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Abstract: 
This article examines the clash between the Superior General Claudio Acquaviva and the 
Spanish Jesuit Hernando de Mendoça, briefly confessor to the Viceroy of Naples count of 
Lemos (1599–1601). It argues that Mendoça’s activities in Naples and the scandal that 
followed were an important influence on Acquaviva’s determination to formalize and push 
forward the regulations for princely confessors in 1602. It situates the confrontation within the 
context of the discontent amongst Spanish Jesuits, and their criticism of Acquaviva’s 
generalate. While Jesuit historiography has generally considered Mendoça’s case as an 
example of individual folly and disobedience, the essay elucidates the significance of his 
agency by taking into account his over-looked writings, which offer new insights into the 
controversy over the role of confession for just government within and without the Society of 
Jesus.  
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Hernando de Mendoça, General Acquaviva and the Controversy over Confession, 
Counsel, and Obedience 
Soon after its foundation, the Society of Jesus received requests from European rulers to 
supply them with confessors. Although Ignatius decided to provide these spiritual advisers, 
this decision caused anxiety and perplexity amongst his companions.
1
 As years went by, these 
concerns deepened, and by the late sixteenth century the order was divided over the merits of 
continuing the policy.
2
 In good Jesuit fashion, these anxieties led to the establishment of a set 
of decrees. After the fifth general congregation of 1593/94 had warned that princely 
confessors must not meddle “with public affairs” or “reason of state” and should avoid 
“seeking familiarity with princes”,3 in 1602 General Claudio Acquaviva (1543–1615) started 
drafting more specific rules. The idea that confessors should focus on their pastoral mission 
and eschew secular business remained the backbone of the final instruction for princely 
confessors, eventually ratified at the sixth general congregation in 1608. Thanks to Robert 
Bireley’s research, we are well informed on the stages in the establishment of the rules De 
Confessariis Principum, as well as on the severe limitations regarding their application when 
put to the test during the Thirty Years War.
4
  
                                                          
1
 Monumenta Ignatiana. Series prima. Sancti Ignatii de Loyola epistolae et instructiones (Madriti: Lopez del 
Horno, 1906), 4:625–28: Ignatius to Diogo Mirão, 1 February 1553. On the first requests for Jesuit confessors, 
see João Francisco Marques, “Confesseurs des princes, les jésuites à la Cour de Portugal,” in Les jésuites à l’âge 
baroque (1540–1640), ed. Luce Giard and Louis de Vaucelles (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996), 213–28.  
2
 See Markus Friedrich, “Politikberatung durch Intellektuelle? Das Verhältnis des Jesuitenordens zu den 
frühneuzeitlichen Fürstenhöfen im Spiegel von Giulio Negronis Traktat ‘Aulicismus, sive de fuga aulae 
dissertatio’,” in Intellektuelle in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Luise Schorn-Schütte (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010), 
175–209; Sabina Pavone, Le astuzie dei Gesuiti. Le false Instruzioni segrete della Compagnia di Gesù e la 
polemica antigesuita nei secoli XVII e XVIII (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2000), 271–88.  
3
 Institutum Societatis Iesu (Florence: Typographia SS. Conceptione, 1893), 2:275–76 (decr. 47 and decr. 48), 
288 (decr. 79). 
4
 See Robert Bireley, “Hofbeichtväter und Politik im 17. Jahrhundert,” in Ignatianisch. Eigenart und Methode 
der Gesellschaft Jesu, ed. Michael Sievernich and Günter Switek (Freiburg: Herder, 1990), 386–403, here 386–
89; The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War. Kings, courts and confessors (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003).  
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 This essay focuses on an affair that might have been a decisive but hitherto overlooked 
influence Acquaviva’s determination in 1602 to define the rules for princely confessors more 
precisely. Amidst the drafts for these rules are papers on an inquest into the “scandalous” 
Spanish Jesuit Hernando de Mendoça (1562–1617), briefly confessor to the Viceroy of Naples 
Don Fernando Ruiz de Castro Andrade y Portugal, 6
th
 count of Lemos (1548–1601). The 
location of these inquest papers next to the draft rules suggests a chronological and thematic 
interconnection between them.
5
 Not only did Mendoça’s spell in Naples (1599–1602) 
coincide with the period during which Acquaviva was completing the new guidelines, it also 
raised issues that were directly relevant to some of the problems these attempted to solve. 
Moreover, when Mendoça returned to Spain in 1603 as confessor to the viceroy’s widow 
Dona Catalina de Sandoval (1555–1628), the affair took a threatening turn that subverted the 
superior general’s most fundamental attribute, namely his capacity to elicit and impose 
obedience.
6
 The evidence of the Mendoça affair suggests that Acquaviva’s disciplining of 
princely confessors was concerned not merely to protect the order against exterior criticism 
but also to limit these confessors’ potentially disruptive effect on the Society’s interior 
hierarchy and cohesion.   
The general’s struggle with Mendoça had considerable local, international, political, 
and religious ramifications. It is best understood in the context of the deep crisis that agitated 
the order at the turn of the sixteenth century, after a ‘Spanish revolt’ had developed after the 
                                                          
5
 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu [hereafter ARSI], Inst. 117 II, ff. 487
r–488v: Instruttione per il Padre 
Francisco Vipera andando in Napoli intorno alle cose del P. Hernando de Mendozza; Ibid., ff. 528
r–534v: 
Instruttione per Confessori de Principi (1602), the final copy signed by Acquaviva on 10 February 1602 on ff. 
540
r–541v. Vipera’s mission to Naples was in January 1602: ARSI, Neapol. 6-II, ff. 470v–472v: Acquaviva to 
Padre Fabio, provincial of Naples, 26 January 1602. 
6
 A confused and Manichean account of Mendoça’s return to Spain, oblivious to the Neapolitan link is in José 
Martínez Millán, “La doble lealtad en la corte de Felipe III: El enfrentamiento entre los padres R. Haller S.I. y F. 
de Mendoça S.I.,” Librosdelacorte.es 1 (2014): 136–62. 
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death of the last Spanish general, Francisco Borja (1510–72).7 As is well-known, the conflict 
took more dramatic forms under Acquaviva and peaked around the general congregations of 
1593 and 1608, which frame the Mendoça affair chronologically. The discontent amongst 
Spanish Jesuits offered the Spanish crown as well as the papacy long-sought opportunities to 
challenge the authority of the Jesuit general from different angles, and for different motives. 
In Spain, the Jesuits’ privileges and their distinctive constitutions conflicted with the 
Inquisition as well as with the crown’s aspiration to control the national clergy. In Rome, 
questions of doctrine, but also papal authority and influence over the general were at issue. 
Although some scholars have alluded to Mendoça’s role in these events, the nature of his 
involvement is little understood.
8
 Jesuit historians in particular, whilst never mincing their 
words to condemn Mendoça’s disobedience, have paid remarkably little attention to his 
ideas.
9
 The Jesuit historian Antonio Astrain, for instance, never mentions that the “rebel” 
Mendoça was also the author of two remarkable and widely noticed publications, which might 
                                                          
7
 On Mercurian’s election, the following anti-converso policies and the exodus of leading Spanish Jesuits, see 
Robert A. Maryks, “The Jesuit order as a ‘Synagogue of Jews’: discrimination against Jesuits of Jewish ancestry 
in the early Society of Jesus,” Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 156 (2009): 339–416. For the eruption of 
dissent under Acquaviva, see Michela Catto, La compagnia divisa. Il dissenso nell’ordine gesuitico tra ‘500 e 
‘600 (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2009), ch. 3; on Acquaviva’s  re-orientation and centralization of the order, see 
Paolo Broggio et al., eds., I Gesuiti ai tempi di Claudio Acquaviva. Strategie politiche, religiose e culturali tra 
Cinque e Seicento (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2007), introduction.  
8
 See Ricardo García Cárcel, “La crisis de la Compañía de Jesús en los últimos años del reinado de Felipe II 
(1585–1598),” in La monarquía de Felipe II a debate, ed. Luis Ribot (Madrid: Sociedad estatal para 
commemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2000), 383–404; José Martínez Millán, 
“Transformación y crisis de la Compañía de Jesús (1578–1594)”, in I Religiosi a corte. Teologia, politica e 
diplomazia in antico regime, ed. Flavio Rurale (Rome: Bulzoni, 1998), 101–29; see also Maria Antonietta 
Visceglia, Roma papale e Spagna. Diplomatici, nobili e religiosi tra due corti (Rome: Bulzoni, 2010), 191–206; 
still useful, though biased is Antonio Astrain, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la assistencia de España, vol. 
3 Mercurian-Acquaviva, 1573–1615 (Madrid: Razón y Fe, 1909), ch. X and XX. There is no mention of 
Mendoça in Catto’s study on Jesuit dissenters. For an account on the complex tensions between Madrid and 
Rome, see Paolo Broggio, “Rome and the ‘Spanish theology’: Spanish Monarchy, doctrinal controversies and 
the defence of papal prerogative during the Pontificate of Clement VIII,” in The Spanish Presence in Sixteenth-
Century Italy. Images of Iberia, ed. Peter Baker-Bates and Miles Pattenden (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 98–102. 
9
 “Paranoia” is quoted by Enrique G. Fernández in his entry on Mendoça in Diccionario Histórico de la 
Compañía de Jesús, ed.  Charles O’Neill and Joaquín Ma. Domínguez (Madrid: Comillas, 2001), 3:2624.  
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be relevant to his agency: one on the faults of the Jesuit constitutions,
10
 the second, under the 
title Tres Tratados,
11
 on problems of distributive justice. On the other hand, the few scholars 
who have shown an interest in Mendoça’s writings generally neglect the institutional and 
biographical context in which they emerged.
12
  
The disconnection between studies of Mendoça’s writings and studies of his activities 
is no accident. It reflects the skewered arrangement of the relevant records in the Jesuit 
archives in Rome, where his disobedience was established post factum and in purely 
behavioural terms between 1606 and 1608.
13
 Although the absence of an official reaction to 
Mendoça’s writings by the Jesuit hierarchy is not necessarily surprising, the silence within the 
order’s remaining internal documentation is remarkable, and it renders the disentangling of 
Mendoça’s case particularly complex.14 The passionate criticism in almost all surviving 
statements is largely explained by Mendoça’s erratic and idiosyncratic behaviour, but there is 
also evidence that the nature of these criticisms induced Acquaviva to exclude crucial 
                                                          
10
 Published in French under the title Advis de ce qu’il y a à réformer en la Cõpagnie des Iesuites, presenté au 
pape & à la congregation generale, par le Père Hernãdo de Mendoça du mesme ordre. Ensemble plusieurs 
Lettres des Indes Orientales, escrites par des Peres Iesuittes, & autres de l’Ordre de S. François, traduictes du 
Portugais (s.l., 1615), the circumstances of the publication are obscure. 
11
 Tres Tratados compuestos por el P. Hernando de Mendoça de la Compañia de Iesus para el Ilusstrissimo y 
Excellentissimo Señor Conde de Lemos Virrey de Napoles y mandados imprimir por el Señor Don Francisco de 
Castro su hijo, y successor en el mismo cargo. El primer de las Gracias ; el segundo de los Officios vendibles ; 
el tercer de las Tratas (Naples: Tarquinio Longo,1602). 
12
 Guenter Lewy, “The struggle for constitutional government in the early years of the Society of Jesus,” Church 
History 29, no. 2 (1960): 141–60, focuses exclusively on the Advis. The Tres Tratados have been mentioned by 
social historians, but not understood within the theological or Jesuit framework; see Roberto Mantelli, Il 
pubblico impiego nell’economia del Regno di Napoli: retribuzioni, reclutamento e ricambio sociale nell’epoca 
spagnuola (secc. XVI –XVII) (Naples: Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici, 1986), 107–36, 255–94. 
13
 An account of Mendoça’s wrong-doings was established in 1606 by the secretary of the order Bernardo de 
Angelis for the Provincial of Naples: ARSI, Neapol. Epist. 194-I, ff. 39
r–48r, forming the basis for an inquest to 
be conducted in Spain in 1606–1608, ARSI, Cast. 33, ff. 132v–136r: Interrogatorio contra M., 1606–1608. The 
contemporary wider inquest Detrimenta Societatis also focused on discipline, see Catto, La Compagnia divisa, 
113.  
14
 After 1600 incoming letters were no longer systematically conserved, and under Muzio Vitelleschi material in 
relation to the conflicts surrounding General Acquaviva was deliberately destroyed, see Flavio Rurale, “‘Lo 
sguardo o la mano del generale’: problemi e prospettive di ricerca nell’Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu,” in 
Gli archivi per la storia degli ordini religiosi. I. Fonti e problemi (secoli XVI-XIX), ed. Massimo Carlo Giannini 
and Matteo Sanfilippo (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2007), 93–109, here 97–99.  
6 
 
communications relating to the affair deliberately from the records. Moreover, a set of letters 
by Mendoça disappeared during the course of the conflict, when pope Clement VIII (1536–
1605) ordered the general to hand them over to him.
15
  
This article tries to re-establish the link between Mendoça’s disobedience and his ideas 
offering a fuller explanation of the episode and its protagonists. Importantly, by showing how 
this politically contingent episode triggered an explosive controversy over the nature of just 
government and the role of confession herein, it clarifies how and why pastoral and Jesuit 
constitutional discussions overlapped. The reconstruction of the episode and its ramifications 
therefore elucidates the crucial role of the instructions for princely confessors for Acquaviva’s 
widely recognized top-down hierarchical reorganization of the Society.  
I. 
When Mendoça arrived in Naples in 1599 his name rang a bell in the Jesuit headquarters in 
Rome. The Spaniard had acquired a reputation for nonconformist behaviour, including 
association with the malcontent memorialistas, which had prompted frequent moves from one 
college to another.
16
 According to the report into his misdoings established in 1606, he had 
breached the Jesuit constitutions on a regular basis: gambling, luxurious Dutch shirts, a 
distinct love for mundane company, “liberty”, and contempt for his superiors loomed large in 
                                                          
15
 ARSI, Inst. 117 II, f. 478
v
, instructing Francisco Vipera to proceed with secrecy and circumspection. ARSI 
Neapol. 6 II, f. 398
r
: Acquaviva to Francisco Rodriguez, 30 November 1601, requesting an oral report in Rome. 
Following a request by the countess of Lemos, Clement VIII ordered Acquaviva to hand over all letters he had 
received from Mendoça, see Astrain, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús, 3:637, this seems to have affected all 
the letters received in 1602. 
16
 He had taught at the colleges in Segovia and Ávila, studied theology in Salamanca, then moved from the 
college in León to that of Medina de Campos, before his ‘banishment’ to Monforte. The investigation conducted 
in 1606 suggested that in each location there were reports on his eccentricity and disobedience: ARSI, Cast. 33, 
f. 133
r
. 
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this list.
17
 He was also said to have sought dismissal from the Society of Jesus around 1591, a 
request which Acquaviva allegedly refused.
18
 As the Jesuit historian Francesco Schinosi 
(1650–1723) remarked, Mendoça had been too clever for his own good, which was why 
Acquaviva decided in 1597 to relegate him to Monforte in Galicia, so that “far away from 
often pernicious and specious friends he might dispose of his many talents in a more 
beneficial manner before old age made them rusty.”19  
The general had been too optimistic. Once he arrived in Monforte, Mendoça struck a 
bond of friendship with the count and countess of Lemos, the protectors of the local Jesuit 
College. The couple not only took him on hunting parties, but recruited him as their 
confessor. This opened exciting perspectives: the patronage leverage of the countess of 
Lemos, sister to the royal valido Lerma (1552–1625) and a hugely influential broker of the 
Sandoval clan, was extraordinary.
20
 In 1599, when her husband was appointed Viceroy of 
Naples, they all set sail to Italy without awaiting the consent of Mendoça’s superior.21 Such 
nonchalance set the pattern for the following years, and Acquaviva initially seemed content to 
go along with this: he granted virtually all of Dona Catalina’s ‘requests’ to award her 
confessor with privileges and exemptions from constraining rules, and when Mendoça took 
                                                          
17
 The Jesuit constitutions regarded luxurious clothing and contempt for superiors as coterminous signs of 
disobedience, see The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, transl. with an introduction and a commentary by 
George E. Ganss (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1970), 245–58. 
18
 ARSI, Neapol. Epist. 194-I, f. 39
r
. On the reluctance regarding dismissals in general, see Sabina Pavone, “I 
dimessi della Compagnia negli anni del generalato di Francesco Borgia: una nuova questione storiografica,” in 
Francisco de Borja y su tiempo: política, religión y cultura en la Edad Moderna, ed. Enrique García Hernán and 
María del Pilar Ryan (Valencia: Albatros Ediciones, 2011), 465–79. 
19
 Francesco Schinosi S.J., Istoria della Compagnia di Giesu, appartenente al Regno di Napoli, parte seconda 
(Naples: Luigi Mutio, 1711), 399. 
20
 See Hillard von Thiessen, “Herrschen mit Verwandten und Klienten. Aufstieg und Fall des Herzog von Lerma, 
Günstlings-Minister Philipps III. von Spanien,” in Nützliche Netzwerke und korrupte Seilschaften, ed. Arne 
Karsten and von Thiessen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 181–206.  
21
 See Isabel Enciso Alonso-Muñumer, “Filiación cortesana y muerte a Nápoles: La trayectoria del VI conde de 
Lemos,” in Felipe II y el Mediterráneo, ed. Ernest Belenguer Cebrià (Madrid: Sociedad estatal para 
commemoración de los centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 1998), 3:515–61.  
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his fourth vow, the countess received permission to hold a splendid public celebration.
22
 
Contrary to the later allegations suggesting that Mendoça had always led a scandalous life, 
when Acquaviva in 1599 requested certificates of his good conduct in Spain and Naples, 
before admitting him to the last vows, no concerns were raised.
23
  
The reasons for Acquaviva’s generosity towards Mendoça and his patrons can be 
easily identified: they established a relationship of mutual obligation full of symbolic and 
political potential. The countess was not only Lerma’s sister. The siblings, through their 
mother, were also the grandchildren of the last Spanish Jesuit General, Francisco Borja.
24
 
Mendoça could now provide access to a family which was at once ‘Jesuit royalty’ and in 
control of Philip III (1578–1621) and his court. Both were of enormous strategic importance: 
proximity to the Sandoval-Borja connection could be a means to overcome the sense of 
alienation and resentment that had animated the Spanish Jesuit ‘rebels’ for decades, whilst 
Lerma’s protection could help to acquire vital royal favour for the entire order. Keeping the 
Sandovals happy was a bonus however one regarded it. It was especially crucial at this 
particular moment, when a condemnation of Molinism, with fatal consequences for the 
order’s identity and maybe its very existence seemed likely.25 
But Acquaviva soon discovered the limits of this deceptively promising arrangement. 
Signs that it was starting to backfire emerged in the late summer of 1600, when the countess 
                                                          
22
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-I, s.p.: Acquaviva to Ludovico Manzoni, provincial of Naples, 24 July 1599 permission to 
reside in the noviciate; f. 160
r
: 23 December 1599 on special public festivities to celebrate Mendoça taking his 
final vows.  
23
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-I, f. 152
v
: Acquaviva to Ludovico Manzoni, 11 December 1599. 
24
 See Patrick Williams, “Grandson of St Francisco de Borja: the duke of Lerma as patron of the Church,”  in 
Francisco de Borja y su tiempo, 371–93; Jodi Bilinkoff, “A Christian and a Gentleman: sanctity and masculine 
honor in Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s Life of Francis Borgia,” in Francisco de Borja y su tiempo, 447–55. 
25
 The Spanish inquisition had started inquests into the Jesuits before the doctrinal conflict took on wider scope 
in 1594 with the papal De Auxiliis congregation, see Paolo Broggio, La teologia e la politica. Controversie 
dottrinali, curia romana e monarchia spagnola tra Cinque e Seicento (Florence: Leo Olschki, 2009), 69–118. 
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complained that Jesuits in the province of Naples had started “badmouthing” Mendoça. With 
some anxiety, Acquaviva reminded the Neapolitan Jesuits how vital maintaining the affection 
of the Lemos was for the Society.
26
 Yet when the Viceroy died in October 1601 and his 
widow stayed on with her second son Don Francisco Ruiz de Castro (1579–1637), who acted 
as interim-Viceroy, serious mud-slinging began. The preposito of Naples reported that 
according to one of his lady penitents secret plans existed to “elevate Mendoça to a 
bishopric”, and that he had used his position to line his pockets.27 Mendoça was accused of 
acting in a secular fashion, indulging in elegant clothing, silk slippers, and nocturnal outings. 
As the Jesuit secretary recorded, a few years later: 
People were grievously pained by his haughty imperiousness, his interest in and greed 
for money, and the favour he showed to the undeserving, whilst he burdened others 
and treated them without courtesy and most illiberally. He conducted himself with 
some women in a manner unbecoming to a religious. … He put people and their 
offices at risk. ... People considered him the origin of their woes and behind him the 
Society that put up with him.
28
  
Dona Catalina was furious, and informed Acquaviva as well as her friends and family in 
Spain, that a cabal of viceregal councillors and local Jesuits spread the most shameless 
gossip.
29
 The general immediately ordered a special envoy to travel to Rome and inform him 
                                                          
26
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-I, f. 240
r
: Acquaviva to Carlo Mastrelli, 19 August 1600. This was also the concern with 
regard to Richard Haller, the confessor of Queen Margarita, who was one of Lerma’s fiercest critics. In 1604 
Haller was forced to send a long justification to the General explaining that he had not been hostile to the valido, 
ARSI, Cast. 33, ff. 109
r–112r. This contradicts Martínez Millán’s assessment of Haller as a tool of submitting 
Madrid to Rome, Martínez Millán, “La doble lealtad”.  
27
 ARSI, Neapol. Epist. 194-I, f. 14
r
: Lucas Pinelli to Acquaviva, 22 October 1601; the Viceroy had died three 
days earlier. 
28
 ARSI, Cast. 33, f. 133
v
; ARSI, Neapol. Epist. 194-I, ff. 39
v–40r: Bernardo de Angelis to the Provincial of 
Naples, 2 May 1606. 
29
 ARSI, Neapol. Epist. 194-I, f. 16
r
: Francisco Rodriguez to Acquaviva, 9 November 1601. 
10 
 
in person,
30
 and when some days later, he received a list of the suspected slanderers amongst 
the Neapolitan fathers, he ordered them to retract: “For God’s sake let’s be cautious and not 
lap up everything that laymen tell us, even when they do so moved by zeal, because dies mali 
sunt, and sometimes the very people who complain are the authors of what they complain 
about and then make us authors of the fables they tell.”31 
Yet, his attempts to soothe the situation failed, matters turning openly hostile when in 
January 1602 Acquaviva sent Francesco Vipera (1532–1605), former provincial of Genoa, to 
Naples with orders to conduct a full investigation. The instructions to Vipera show that 
although Acquaviva did not believe the allegations that Mendoça had taken kick-backs for 
favours, he accepted that he had behaved foolishly and behaved like a courtier.
32
 The main 
problem, however, was the choice of Vipera as investigator. Mendoça and the countess 
interpreted it as a deliberate provocation and personal offence, since they had clashed with 
him already in Genoa on their way to Naples he had objected to Mendoça staying not in the 
Jesuit house but in the palace with the Lemos couple.
 33
 
The countess therefore refused to receive Vipera and Mendoça at this point apparently 
wrote a defiant letter to the general, which Acquaviva was later forced to hand over the pope. 
Acquaviva’s reaction was weary, “paternally” admonishing his “subject” to reflect on the tone 
he adopted. The general was outraged at the condesa’s threat that, if he did not banish the 
accused fathers immediately, she would withdraw her protection from the order. Acquaviva 
                                                          
30
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-II, f. 398
r
: three separate letters by Acquaviva to the countess of Lemos, Mendoça and 
Francisco Rodriguez dated 10 November 1601. 
31
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-II, f. 401
r
: Acquaviva to Carlo Mastrelli, 24 November 1601; ibid. Acquaviva to Luca 
Spinelli, preposito di Napoli, 24 November 1601.  
32
 ARSI, Inst. 117-II, ff. 487
r–488v.  
33
 ARSI, Neapol. 6-II, ff. 470
v–472v: Acquaviva to Padre Fabio, provincial of Naples, 26 January 1602; ff. 473r–
474
r
: Acquaviva to Vipera, 26 January 1602. 
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regarded this as intolerable and reflecting a failure by Mendoça in his pastoral role: the 
confessor’s first duty of obedience was to God and the general, not to his penitent; it was his 
responsibility to call the countess to order, reminding her that her affection for her confessor 
must be directed not towards his person, but towards the Society of Jesus as a body.
34
 Yet 
Mendoça and Dona Catalina made it clear that they considered themselves above the Jesuit 
chain of obedience. They appealed directly to Clement VIII to grant a brief that not only 
cleared Mendoça’s name, but also prohibited any investigation into his conduct. When the 
countess returned to Spain to become lady-in-waiting to the Queen, the pope granted 
Mendoça a host of privileges that allowed him to conduct his office as her confessor in 
whatever way he pleased, without supervision from his superiors.
35
 
The confrontation with Mendoça undoubtedly convinced Acquaviva how urgent it was 
to clarify, reinforce, and implement instructions for princely confessors, and some passages in 
the draft rules of 1602 are reminiscent of the general’s problems during this episode. There 
was an insistence that the princely confessors must live as  
subjects of the ordinary and observe the habitual discretion and rules that apply to all, 
and there must be no exception, no matter under what pretext, even though the 
business they might conduct for the Prince requires secrecy … They must observe the 
Regula, and where there is abuse the Provincial has to impose himself and make sure 
that rules are observed ... they must not have receive or hold any money, distribute or 
receive presents, because all these things, such as going out without permission and 
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where they like, destroy the order and its spirit in the mind of people and they are in 
no way necessary to the service of the Prince or beneficial to his office.
36
  
The regulations also stressed that the confessor must always work to “direct the Prince’s 
affection and devotion to the Society, not to his own person, because this is a pestilence for 
him and the order.”37 The Mendoça affair was in many ways was a textbook case of the 
dangers inherent in supplying princes with confessors: sliding into worldliness was a matter 
not only of clothing and mingling with courtiers, but also of active involvement in ‘politics’, 
particularly in the distribution of grace as part of government, through which the entire order 
attracted criticism of factionalism. Particularly worrying, however, were the repercussions on 
discipline. If critics of the Society of Jesus feared that Jesuit confessors used the confidence 
and access they enjoyed to exploit rulers in their order’s interest, the example of Mendoça 
showed another –contrary– reality: that confessors might use their penitents’ and patrons’ 
affection for their own ends, to escape the constraints of their position and to defy the 
general’s leadership, undermining the very principles of (Jesuit) obedience. Mendoça had 
even managed to mobilize papal authority to resist the general, giving a singular and 
unintended meaning to the Jesuit submission to the pontiff.  
II. 
Mendoça’s disobedience did not cease with his return to Spain. Using the royal court as his 
stage, he now pressed matters onto an ideological level, whipping up the still numerous Jesuit 
malcontents in Spain against the general.
38
 Despite the clamp-down on the Spanish 
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perturbatores after the fifth general congregation in 1593, the Castilian province in particular 
continued to be riddled with strife, and the flow of memoranda denouncing the general’s 
“tyranny”, disorderly management, and disregard for the Spanish element within the Society, 
would not cease. Mendoça, sniping against Acquaviva, Bellarmine (1542–1621) and the 
Queen’s confessor, the Austrian Jesuit Richard Haller (1551–1612), now became their 
spokesman. Crucially, with the help of his penitent, he mobilized both papal and royal support 
against Acquaviva and to demand that he should visit the Spanish provinces in order to 
acknowledge and recognize their woes.
39
 Eventually, only Clement VIII’s death in March 
1605 prevented this humiliation and, as the Jesuit historian Astrain famously put it, “for the 
second time God saved the Society from grave peril by the death of His vicar.”40 
 Probably around this time, Mendoça composed a memorandum, ‘leaked’ years later 
(1615) in French translation, which severely criticized the Jesuit constitutions.
41
 The Advis de 
ce qu’il y a à reformer dans la Cõpagnie revolved around two core points: the general’s 
“absolutism” and the (ab)use of confession as a tool of government within the Society. 
Mendoça reiterated a demand rejected at the fifth general congregation that the general’s term 
of office should be limited to six years. He explained the reasons for this in highly politicized 
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terms: “As they [the generals] are appointed perpetually and never held to account, they 
become insolent absolute tyrants [sic!] who commit many injustices, and they cannot be 
stopped, as one can see in this Society.”42 The institutional defect was exacerbated by 
incomplete and unfair gathering of information. According to Mendoça, the reliance on the 
Jesuit system of long-distance reporting and filing, instead of first-hand inspection, 
profoundly distorted the order’s government.43 It produced a closed and dysfunctional system 
that fomented slander and back-stabbing at the bottom and biased information at the top, 
which in turn resulted in bad counsel and unjust, “tyrannical” government.44 To redress this 
problem, Mendoça suggested that the general should personally visit each province at least 
every six years and that the Spanish provinces should elect a special general, residing in 
Spain, to protect and oversee their interests.
45
 This demand echoed a wider call for 
decentralization and greater autonomy for the provinces that was shared by most Spanish 
malcontents, one of which, Juan de Mariana (1536–1624), formulated his own criticism of the 
Jesuit constitutions during the same period.
46
 The critics, then, established a direct connection 
between flawed information gathering on the one side and the negative features of 
centralization on the other. A crucial aspect herein – which Mariana, however, left 
unmentioned – was the use of confession as an instrument of Jesuit government. The question 
was a particularly sensitive one, as the Jesuits’ external critics and enemies like the 
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Dominicans also tended to emphasize, suggesting in particular the Jesuits’ regular 
infringements on the secrecy of confession.
47
 The Advis fuelled such accusations as it stressed 
the particularly damaging allegation that Jesuit regulations undermined the charitable precept 
of fraternal correction.  
The problem of “fraternal correction” was hotly debated in sixteenth-century Spain 
exposing tensions and contradictions between the authority of confessors and inquisitors.
48
 
The precept based on Matthew 18:15 was widely used in canon law and commonly applied in 
the governance of religious orders. Mendoça’s complaints focused on his order’s often 
ambiguous handling of the sacrament of penance amongst its members. The regulations 
prescribed not only that every Jesuit unveiled his conscience to his superior every six months 
outside confession, but also, and crucially, that during this process they must reveal the 
failings of their brethren. Once a year, they had to “manifest their consciences” to their 
superior, “in confession, or in secret”, so that he could direct them “along the path of 
salvation.”49 In addition, all Jesuits had to confess regularly to an appointed confessor of their 
profess houses who should not be the superior. However, in reserved cases only the superior 
could pronounce absolution, so he still gathered sensitive and confidential information on the 
men he ruled. This was highly problematic: obviously, superiors could not use information 
gathered in confession, but the boundaries between confession and administrative disciplining 
powers were blurred. It seemed unlikely that a superior would not put to use the knowledge he 
held via the ‘confessional’, particularly as the fifth general congregation had included 
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“sedition” and “disobedience” in the reserved cases. As Mendoça’s experience demonstrated, 
this was a flexible category that could include anything from wardrobe extravagance to 
articulate institutional criticism.
50
 According to Mendoça, the system not only enabled 
superiors to identify and eliminate critical voices while formally preserving confessional 
secrecy, but also provided an open invitation to the evil-minded to denounce their fellows or 
spread unfounded allegations. Hence many Jesuits, he claimed, tried to avoid confession 
altogether with obvious deleterious consequences for their and the order’s spiritual health.51 
Against this, Mendoça vehemently defended what he considered to be an imprescriptible right 
to fraternal correction to protect all Christians against damage to their most precious property, 
i.e. their fama and reputation, i.e. the essence of their honour.
 52
 It could not be abolished by 
entering a religious order, and, as he stressed, nobody was asked formally to renounce to it 
upon entering the Society of Jesus. Jesuit practice therefore annihilated a core element of 
charity and justice, supporting the existing structural drift towards arbitrary and potentially 
tyrannical government. 
These allegations were not entirely new or original, but with Mendoça’s arrival in 
Madrid they re-gained traction, giving credence to the anti-Jesuit myths that members of the 
Society as a matter of principle leaked and used information gained in confession.
53
 It is 
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probably no coincidence that with Mendoça’s return to Spain, Pedro de Ribadeneira (1526–
1611) felt prompted to react authoritatively to such criticism. In 1605, he published a large 
volume in defence of the Society and its constitutions, on which he had been working for 
some time. Using an arsenal of theological authorities, his defensive Tratado sought to 
demonstrate that the Jesuit regulations were neither extravagant nor contrary to Catholic 
doctrine.
54
 He insisted that many of the traits under attack were common to a wide range of 
rules of the regular clergy, such as the Dominicans, and also defended the order’s specific 
rules in terms of its particular missions and goals. Ribadeneira emphasized that the critics had 
not understood that on entering a religious order, one submitted to a higher end; it was 
necessary therefore, to privilege “the benefit of the brother’s soul over his fama and 
reputation.”55 Ribadeneira did not dignify the critics by giving their names, and he caricatured 
them as “a handful of young people, friends of liberty, enemies of rigour and religious 
observance, moved by self-interest.”56  
III. 
Although official Jesuit records tend to regard Mendoça’s lack of obedience, of which his lax 
conduct was just one symptom, as the reason for the scandal he caused in Naples, another text 
by Mendoça suggests an alternative explanation for why the report on him in 1606 remarked 
that he had angered the good society of Naples by showing favour “to the undeserving, whilst 
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he burdened others and treated them without courtesy and most illiberally.”57 What might 
have been at issue was how he counselled the Viceroy in matters of conscience. In 1602, 
shortly after Lemos’s death, Mendoça published three small treatises on the principles he had 
followed in his office that appeared together under the title Tres Tratados. They were a 
scathing indictment of venality and other abuses in the Vice-Kingdom, which have earned 
Mendoça the reputation of a “moral rigorist” (!) among social historians of Naples.58 The Tres 
tratados are indeed a perfectly serious piece of moral reasoning on the problem of acceptio 
personarum, the major sin against distributive justice, another controversial topic among 
Spanish moral theologians at that time.
59
 It revolved around the question of how far personal 
preference might influence the distribution of offices and royal grace, and whether venality 
was a cause of injustice because it prevented the appointment of the most qualified people, 
damaging the res publica and the common good.
60
 While the controversy was generally 
fought out in Latin folios authored by some of the major voices of Iberian second 
scholasticism, Mendoça published his argument in Spanish, adding supporting expert 
statements in Latin by a handful of serious theologians from the kingdom of Naples. As he 
explained in his introduction, his tract was just the beginning, and he was prepared to follow 
up the details during confession, a remark that suggests that the treatise had already been 
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under preparation during the Viceroy’s lifetime.61 Mendoça insisted that he was obliged to 
tackle this problem publicly, given the eye-watering levels of scandalous favouritism and 
venality in the administration of the Vice-Kingdom. He was forced to do so because the 
Neapolitan clergy out of ignorance or sinful lack of moral principles were an obstacle to 
moral and political reform. They had even accused him of being “scrupulous”, no compliment 
given that moral theologians generally likened “scrupulosity” to a kind of moral 
hypochondria.
62
 The Tratados not only showcased how acceptio and venality had to be 
analysed from the viewpoint of moral theology but also that Mendoça possessed the expert 
knowledge and moral competence to perform the office of confessor and counsellor of 
conscience to the man who was the King’s “living image” in an important outpost of the 
Monarchia Hispanica.
63
 Mendoça publication reminded both his penitent and the public of 
the principles of just government and of the crucial role of confessors as counsellors to 
achieve it. 
 Mendoça proceeded along a classical dialectical opposition of pro and contra 
arguments, to which he added a long conclusion that left no doubt about his judgement. The 
experts he quoted contradict the generally ventilated impression that Mendoça was just a 
mundane libertine. All the men who explicitly endorsed the Tratados were famous for their 
scholarly and moral rigour. There was the fellow Neapolitan Jesuit Martino Fornari (1547–
1612), author of a rigorist confession manual, who had long taught at the Collegium 
Romanum. Another was the Theatine Giambattista del Tufo († 1622), bishop of the small 
town of Acerra near Naples, who in 1603 resigned the bishopric he had held since 1587 to 
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dedicate the rest of his life to writing the history of his order. Mario de Andria (1537–1606) 
finally, was a Jesuit with recognised expertise in matters of confession and questions of 
restitution.
64
 
 The Tres tratados examine the question of acceptio along the classical lines of 
distributive justice and ownership of offices. They argued that just government was ruined 
because principles of favouritism supplanted criteria of qualification and suitability, severely 
damaging justice and the reputation of the Spanish monarch vis-à-vis his subjects in the 
viceroyalty. Mendoça blamed the viceregal councillors and local administrators for falsely 
labelling their sins and vices as virtuous liberality. Unlimited liberality, he noted, always 
tipped over into injustice. Moreover, Viceroys as royal lieutenants did not enjoy the same 
degree of liberty as the monarch they represented; their authority was defined and limited by 
royal laws.
65
 Importantly, adopting a line of reasoning championed by Domingo Bañez O.P. 
(1528–1604), who had argued that offices were bona communia over which the res publica 
still held ownership, Mendoça insisted that neither kings, nor viceroys, fully owned the 
offices they distributed. Limits on venality, however, followed not only from the question of 
ownership but also from the principle that just government must protect the subjects’ right to 
receive competent and qualified officers, which venality and favouritism undermined.
66
 
Mendoça stressed that Spanish legislation since the days of the Catholic Kings had always 
imposed severe limits on the sale of offices.
67
 He also rejected the presumption that customary 
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law permitted it, denouncing such arguments as a badly disguised excuse for misgovernment 
and abuse of office. Customary laws, so Mendoça, anticipating here an argument Suárez 
(1548–1617) was to make in De legibus (1612), were null, unless they had been confirmed by 
royal ordinances.
68
  
 It is hardly surprising that Mendoça’s robust legal and moral-theological denunciation 
of the commerce of offices and royal grace in the Kingdom of Naples angered those who 
thrived on such practices, i.e. the local elites as well as the local clergy he accused of having 
failed in their duty of disciplining their consciences, as they should. If the ideas in the Tres 
Tratados had indeed been the basis for his counsel to the Viceroy, this might explain why the 
Neapolitan officers retaliated with damaging accusations about the confessor’s moral 
corruption. The following (Jesuit) narrative that he was a loose cannon and morally dubious 
character, however, clearly jars with the support Mendoça had gathered from three clergymen 
famous for their impeccable conduct and doctrine. It points instead to deep divisions 
traversing the Neapolitan political and clerical elites and to the possibility that the accusations 
against Mendoça were partly a politically motivated fabrication to bring him down as soon as 
his powerful penitent drew his last breath. Yet the timing of the publication of Tres Tratados 
in 1602 also allows for a contrary interpretation. It is not beyond reasonable doubt to suggest 
that Mendoça used moral-theological arguments as a means of self-defence to discredit and 
de-legitimise his critics. In any event, it is impossible to understand Mendoça’s case without 
taking into account the Tres Tratados, either as the source of, or response to his troubles, so 
far as they engaged the role of the princely confessor and his wider understanding of just and 
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limited government which were relevant for his critique of his own order as well as for that of 
the government of Naples, capturing the inevitable frictions generated in counselling the 
conscience of rulers.  
 Conclusion 
After his return to Spain, Mendoça was able to cultivate his open disobedience against 
Acquaviva not only because he initially enjoyed the support of the influential Lerma-faction, 
but also because of the special protection that Clement VIII’s breve had awarded him which 
suspended Acquaviva’s order that Mendoça should return to Rome to be investigated.69 But 
matters soon changed. Clement VIII’s death in 1605 spared the order a doctrinal 
condemnation in De Auxiliis controversy and Acquaviva a humiliating trip to Spain, as 
Mendoça and his supporters had demanded. On both fronts Paul V (1552–1621) decided to 
take the heat out of the conflict and to protect the interests of the Society of Jesus as presented 
by its general, without antagonizing the Spanish crown.
70
 It was helpful in this context that by 
1605, Lerma and his sister no longer saw eye to eye, as the countess had taken exception to 
her brother’s handling of court patronage.71 With his sister joining his critics, protecting 
Mendoça and entertaining his campaign against the general was probably no longer a priority 
for the royal favourite. This assisted a compromise that allowed all sides to save face. In 1607, 
Philip III nominated Mendoça to the bishopric of Cuzco in Peru, while Acquaviva agreed to 
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his dismissal from the Society.
72
 With Mendoça removed, the upheaval amongst the Spanish 
Jesuits effectively collapsed. The extraordinary sixth general congregation in 1608 ended in a 
victory for the Jesuit general. The congregation unequivocally condemned the “troublemakers 
... who use the efforts of whatever persons, whether members of the Society or not to trouble 
the peace of the Society”73 and ratified the instructions for “confessors of royal persons” that 
Acquaviva had prepared. Moreover, the congregation underlined that it was “not licit for Ours 
–particularly by reason of their special status as dealing with princes or eminent personages or 
acting as their confessors– to accept anything for their own use and disposition, and that 
superiors should not have the authority to permit this.”74  
 Meanwhile, as Mendoça sailed to Peru to end his days as a surprisingly well-reputed 
bishop and efficient administrator of his diocese,
75
 his writings took on a life of their own. 
They entered the repertoire of texts quoted throughout the seventeenth century and in very 
different contexts when questions of counsel to princes were at issue. The Tres Tratados lost 
some of their polemical contours and became a recommended work of sound advice for 
Viceroys and their counsellors in matters of justice and liberality.
76
 The fate of Mendoça’s 
criticism of the Jesuit constitutions was entirely different. Although after 1608 the Society 
appeared pacified and the general’s rule strengthened, some of the discontent moved 
underground, giving rise to a steady and corrosive trickle of ‘leaked’ documents. The first 
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were the famous Monita Secreta in 1614, penned by a disgruntled Jesuit; Mendoça’s French 
Advis followed in 1615, the year of Acquaviva’s death. The likeliest explanation is that a 
Jesuit malcontent in Rome or Madrid orchestrated the publication of Mendoça’s manuscript, 
which must have widely circulated in Spanish before the sixth general congregation, but of 
which no copy nowadays exists in the Jesuit central archives. The Advis and the Monita throw 
into sharp relief what Sabina Pavone has called “Jesuit anti-Jesuitism.”77 They were 
remembered together and were still were a staple tool of polemics in the campaign against 
Eberhard Nithard (1607–81), the Jesuit confessor of Queen Mariana de Austria (1634–96), to 
suggest that he was not to be trusted with counselling the Queen on matters of state, as he 
might leak them to Rome.
78
 Over the seventeenth century, Mendoça’s Advis, the Monita, and 
Mariana’s critique became a topical trilogy within the ever-widening corpus of Anti-Jesuit 
writing, despite some substantial differences between the three texts. While the Monita 
adopted the satirical device of posing as an ‘authentic’ Jesuit regulation that supported 
theories of a concerted Jesuit conspiracy ‘via the confessional’, Mariana’s and Mendoça’s 
writings were leaked testimonies, revealing deep constitutional tensions amongst the Jesuits 
far beyond the regulations of the Society of Jesus itself. Both Spaniards deplored the order’s 
growing centralization and opposed in no uncertain terms the unbalanced and absolute power 
of the general. Mobilizing a classical argument in political theory, they identified the 
suppression of good counsel as a major cause and attribute of tyranny. What distinguished 
Mendoça’s criticism from Mariana’s was the urgency with which he insisted on the necessity 
of confession as a means of good and fraternal counsel, denouncing its distortion in the name 
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of discipline and obedience.
79
 This was certainly drawn from his own experience as a victim 
of Jesuit regulations, but also as a protagonist of good counsel, as he saw it, in his role as 
princely confessor. The two sides were not randomly connected by experience alone; they 
seem to have been informed by an underlying understanding according to which confession 
was primarily good counsel to establish good and just government, within the Society of 
Jesus, and, through its princely confessors, also in the saeculum.  
(Nicole Reinhardt, University of Durham/UK) 
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